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Introduction
One message from the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis has 
been a critique of the unfettered market, which was 
ampliﬁed as the outgoing Bush administration secured 
legislation for bailouts of ﬁnancial ﬁrms and followed 
with temporary loans to support the automobile 
industry.  Democrats responded with demands for a 
more consumer-oriented policy: support for mortgage 
holders and for a ﬁscal stimulus that would reach the 
unemployed. 
 The new president took the critique a step further. 
Barack Obama won the election with proposals to 
stimulate speciﬁc sectors: wind and solar energy, 
hybrid and electric-powered vehicles, and various 
infrastructure measures. Once in ofﬁce, he moved 
to wrap these initiatives into the “stimulus package” 
enacted in February, and followed with additional 
proposals to regulate major ﬁnance industry units and 
subsidize particular manufacturing sectors. The stimulus 
promised to save or create 3.5 million jobs in 2009 and 
2010, and promoted the production of non-petroleum 
energy and transportation.
 Thus a likely consequence of the ﬁnancial crisis 
was at least a partial policy shift away from the 
forty-year service-economy trend (led by the ﬁnance 
sectors), back toward some degree of manufacturing. 
“Keynesian” ideas came back, and with them returned 
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talk of “industrial policy”—always implicit in any 
government support for private ﬁrms and sectors.  Such 
policies would perhaps be augmented by additional 
federal government support for manufacturing and 
other non-service sectors. 
 Strong federal support for these sectors would 
be welcome during this time of growing economic 
insecurity.  But if we look back to the late 1970s 
and early 1980s—a previous period of economic 
restructuring—there is evidence for the importance of 
local scale efforts, particularly those embodied in the 
cities.  Speciﬁcally, we could learn from the local level 
response to manufacturing job loss.  This history helps 
reveal the critical role municipal governments, activists, 
and community members can play in addressing today’s 
related challenge of job loss.
 The federal policy environment of the 1980s 
differed from that of today, partially because the shock 
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of plant closings was still recent and ongoing.  The 
shock has faded, but it was well documented at the time 
(e.g. Bensman & Lynch, 1987).  Less well known were 
the positive responses and hopes for recovery the crisis 
engendered.  One manifestation of this was a national, 
if brief, call for “industrial policy” that would save 
the nation’s manufacturing base.  Economists Barry 
Bluestone and Bennett Harrison (1982) were among 
the leaders analyzing the causes of industrial decline 
and calling for a national industrial policy to stem the 
job and productivity losses, but Business Week (June 3 
1980) championed the idea as well. 
 On the local and regional scales, municipal 
governments and community labor coalitions were the 
primary actors.  On the government side, there was a 
shift in local economic development practices from 
“smokestack chasing” to growing small businesses 
locally, incorporating new uses of eminent domain 
and zoning, and developing industry task forces.  The 
community and labor reaction to plant closings was 
much more diverse, and in many places displayed 
characteristics of a social movement.  It featured 
initiatives such as employee buyouts, experiments 
in worker management, support organizations that 
provided research and technical advice, and ﬁghts to 
pass laws requiring advance notice of closings.  Among 
these responses, early warning systems may have been 
the most broadly participatory. 
Plant Closings and Early Warning: Chicago 
 While the battle to pass federal plant closing 
legislation raged throughout the worst years of industrial 
job loss, community and labor groups across the country 
immediately recognized the necessity of providing early 
warning of plant closures.  Early warning networks 
gathered two forms of knowledge: information from 
workers about what was going on inside a plant, and 
public domain research.  This information was used to 
monitor a plant for signs of a potential closure (LeRoy, 
Swinney & Charpentier, 1986).  Early warning of the 
intent to shut down or move a plant was crucial in order 
to either prevent the closure or secure a better deal for 
the workers and surrounding community.  
 Bluestone and Harrison’s 1982 book The 
Deindustrialization of America, while arguing for a 
national government response to deindustrialization, 
also accords great import to local early warning 
systems.  While outlining the core tenets of a proposed 
program of “democratic socialist reindustrialization,” 
they acknowledge that the struggle ahead will be long. 
The Steel Task Force presents its ﬁndings in a press conference, December 10, 1986.  Mayor Harold Washington is on 
the far right, and Rob Mier, Commissioner of the Department of Economic Development, stands just behind the podium to 
the left of the presenter.  Photo courtesy of the Harold Washington Archives and Collections, Chicago Public Library.
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However, there is certainty about where to begin:  
…in the unions, in the non-unionized 
workplaces, and in the labor-community-
church coalitions that have sprung up in areas 
such as Ohio, Connecticut, California, RI.  
People need to systematically monitor their 
companies’ investment and disinvestment 
activities, beginning with the development 
of shopﬂoor early warning systems (263).
 There were examples of local early warning 
networks in several locations, but our analysis begins 
with a review of the Chicago case.  Chicago of the 
1980s, similar to other rust belt cities of its time, was 
undergoing a painful transformation of its economic 
base. The city lost 13,000 jobs in the steel industry and 
the manufacturing sector declined 27% overall between 
1977 and 1982 (Giloth & Moe, 1999).   
 Raymond Gutierrez was one of the 13,000 workers 
who lost their jobs during this time. The Chicago 
Tribune reported:
Gutierrez and his co-workers were pushed 
out of the mainstream economy on March 
28, 1980, the same day they were locked out 
of Wisconsin Steel. “They put us out the way 
you put a stray dog onto the street,” he said.  
“They didn’t say nothing. When our shift 
was over, they just locked the doors behind 
us. It wasn’t until the next day that we found 
out the mill was shut down, maybe for good. 
It took a year before they even let us back in 
to clean out our lockers. 
Gutierrez’s story was not atypical.   At the time there was 
no legal obligation for companies to give their workers 
notice of an imminent closure.  In fact, companies were 
loath to do so.   Plans to close or move a factory were 
often kept secret as long as possible, so as to avoid work 
slowdowns or other labor unrest.  
 In response to the plant shutdown, workers in 
Chicago and elsewhere did not remain passive victims. 
Instead, workers and community members mobilized. 
In Chicago, early warning work was a key part of the 
mobilization against plant closures.
 The two primary organizations instrumental in 
developing Chicago’s early warning network during the 
early 1980s were the Midwest Center for Labor Research 
(MCLR) and the University of Illinois’ Center for Urban 
Economic Development (CUED).   In addition, the 
city government played a catalytic role, reﬂecting the 
establishment of a community development orientation 
in the Department of Economic Development (DED) 
under the new mayor, Harold Washington.
MCLR was founded by Dan Swinney in 1982. 
The organization was inspired by Swinney’s personal 
experience of job loss.  From 1975, Swinney worked 
as a lathe operator at Taylor Forge.  But when Gulf and 
Western purchased Taylor Forge, they implemented 
a destructive business strategy that would become 
increasingly common during the 1980s.  Gulf and 
Western drained the value from the company over a 
period of years, with the hope of investing the capital 
in other sectors to make a quick proﬁt.  By 1983, Taylor 
Forge had been shut down. 
 Swinney began MCLR as an organization designed 
to provide research and technical aid to workers, labor 
unions, progressive local government and business, 
and community activists engaged in attempts to stem 
manufacturing job loss.  Swinney’s analysis of the 
Chicago manufacturing economy directly challenged 
the dominant narrative of the time period.   He found 
that the majority of manufacturing companies in 
Chicago weren’t large, publicly traded companies, 
struggling in the face of global competition; rather, they 
were small, often privately held companies facing the 
types of problems that could be solved.   
 Swinney estimated that, with enough notice, 75 
percent of the plants that were shut down in the 1980s 
could have been saved (Swinney, 1998).   This ﬁnding 
reinforced the deﬁning idea behind the early warning 
movement in general, which held that the job and 
productivity losses of the 1980s were not inevitable. 
Organizers of early warning networks maintained 
that there were alternatives to the majority of plant 
shutdowns, and with enough time or resources solutions 
could be developed.  
 The other center involved in the Chicago early 
warning experiment was CUED, where David Ranney 
was a key intellectual and activist. Ranney, like 
Swinney, also had experience working in factories and 
labor organizing.  During the 1970s Ranney left his 
teaching at University of Wisconsin to work in Chicago 
factories, where he organized for better pay and working 
conditions.  Ranney worked with steel workers on the 
South Side of Chicago, where he saw ﬁrsthand the 
effects of deindustrialization on communities.  
 In 1983 Ranney joined CUED to work with Rob 
Mier  in order to study alternatives to deindustrialization. 
Throughout the 1980s, Ranney continued to devote his 
academic work to questions of job loss and economic 
restructuring in Chicago and beyond.  In addition, Ranney 
continued to work with the Wisconsin Steelworkers 
Save Our Jobs Committee and other worker groups, 
seeking to increase understanding of broader economic 
forces (Ranney, 2003).  
 Starting in 1983, CUED and MCLR were funded 
by the Chicago DED to develop a cohesive early 
warning system on the West Side of Chicago.   Together 
the two groups founded the West Side Jobs Network, 
a community labor coalition designed to gather 
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information on plants and organize community and 
worker support in order to implement early warning. 
As a result of their early warning work, the West Side 
Jobs Network engaged in several ﬁghts over key plant 
closings (Giloth & Rosenblum, 1971).     The symbiotic 
relationship between Washington’s progressive 
DED and community activists was complicated, but 
ultimately valuable.  The fact that tension between 
the city and community groups did exist was clear. 
Nonetheless, Ranney later reﬂected that while an early 
warning network is not dependent on local government 
for “formation or continuation,” it probably cannot 
operate well without local government support (Wiewel 
& Ranney, 1985).  
Early Warning and the U.S. Economy
 Chicago was an important site for organizing anti-
plant-closing campaigns and early warning activities, 
but it was one of many.  Early warning took hold across 
the country during the early 1970s and through the 1980s 
as a practical method of addressing plant closings.  By 
the 1980s a movement was building in opposition to 
the waste of so many previously productive factories 
and communities.  But early warning’s appeal was more 
than practical; it also represented an alternative vision 
for the nation’s economy.  
 The scholars and activists who wrote about early 
warning argued that it was more than just a response 
to the immediate event of a plant closing.  Rather, it 
represented a broader argument about how the economy 
should and could work.  Swinney and others maintained 
that by the 1970s, labor had erroneously ceded too 
much power to business regarding decisions about our 
nation’s productive capacity.    
 These arguments at the community level found 
reinforcement in academic work, most prominently 
from Bluestone and Harrison, whose aforementioned 
landmark book on deindustrialization established that 
falling proﬁts from international competition, as well 
as emerging technologies that afforded greater capital 
mobility, provided a context for plant closings.  By the 
1980s manufacturing plants were regularly bought by 
conglomerates to be used as collateral to access capital 
for investments in other sectors, where large proﬁts 
might be made quickly.  Increasingly, it seemed that 
factory owners were not acting as benevolent stewards 
of the productivity and potential that their factories 
and workers represented.  According to Bluestone and 
Harrison,
One possible reaction to [falling proﬁts] 
would have been to try to meet the new 
competition in the old-fashioned way—an 
active search for new markets, increased 
research and development, and investments 
in more efﬁcient technology.  Some American 
ﬁrms took this route, but many more 
decided instead to abandon the competition 
altogether (as in electronics), to reduce 
their investments (as in steel), or to focus 
all their energies on reducing labor costs 
and circumventing public sector taxes and 
regulations. In a desperate attempt to restore, 
or preserve, the rates of proﬁt to which they 
had become accustomed in the halcyon days 
of the 1950s and 1960s, American corporate 
managers in the 1970s went to extraordinary 
lengths to shift capital as rapidly as possible, 
from one activity, one region, and one nation 
to another. In the process, the industrial base 
of the American economy began to come 
apart at the seams.
Coalition Work
 Organizers concluded that the economy needed 
a much broader set of people, particularly workers, to 
have decision-making roles.   Early warning activists 
believed that in order to get more power, they needed 
to build broad-based coalitions with diverse groups that 
would be affected by the closing: labor, community-
based organizations, local politicians, and city economic 
development representatives.  At times, coalition work 
extended into the business realm.  Many early warning 
groups drew distinctions between good and bad business 
practices, and in some cases they worked successfully 
with plant owners, either to avert a closing or to arrange 
a solution such as an employee buyout.
Worker Participation
 Worker participation was the foundation of 
community and labor-led early warning systems, and 
distinguished them from advance notice plant closing 
legislation. While the organizations that built Chicago’s 
early warning system beneﬁted from support from 
Mayor Washington’s administration, government-only 
early warning systems were limited.  Early warning 
community leaders agreed that there was a core element 
of these systems that had to come from below (Nissen, 
1991, 1995; Wiewel & Ranney, 1985; and Giloth & 
Rosenblum, 1987).   Employee knowledge was essential 
for understanding the nuances of the workplace and the 
work itself. 
 In addition to practical concerns about gaining 
access to insider knowledge, early warning leaders 
expressed a normative commitment to building early 
warning networks around workers.  Lynn Feekin, 
Director of the Calumet Project for Industrial Jobs in 
Northwest Indiana  in the 1980s, believes that a core 
idea behind early warning was to instill a sense of a 
worker’s right to participate in decisions about the 
economy.  Part of the Calumet Project’s early warning 
training included asking workers to envision the future 
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of their region’s economy.  Asking questions about who 
makes the decisions about a region’s economy, and 
who bears the consequences, helped to reveal structural 
forms of injustice.   
Dissemination
 The ideas behind early warning, and the diversity 
of local groups involved in ﬁghting plant closings, were 
well represented in the stream of publications issued 
on the topic between 1981 and 1994.  The publications 
were authored by university study groups, community-
based organizations, progressive research and technical 
organizations, and labor unions.  Several of the 
publications were linked to conferences or other events 
that had drawn activists together under the umbrella of 
broader progressive agendas, such as the Conference on 
Alternative State and Local Policies.  
 Many of the publications included checklists 
designed to help workers spot indicators that a plant 
might be in danger of closing.  They often included how-
to sections, with aids such as sample legislation, drafts 
of letters to the editor, and instructions on how to locate 
public records, as well as the names of individuals and 
organizations to contact for further resources.  These 
tools conveyed the idea of working documents, intended 
for the hands of those who wanted to take action.  
 The Chicago-based publications of the time period 
were representative.  The MCLR’s 1986 pamphlet, “Early 
Warning Manual: Against Plant Closing,” is a “how-to” 
manual addressed to unions, workers, community-based 
organizations and economic development ofﬁcials. 
It deﬁnes the early warning system as a labor and 
community-based network of information sharing and 
research, combining information from the shop ﬂoor 
with every possible public source in order to anticipate 
a company’s shutdown or disinvestment plans while 
there is still time to intervene.  The authors pay special 
attention to both the difﬁculty and potential rewards of 
coalition work, emphasizing union participation as an 
essential element of gaining institutional knowledge. 
The manual goes step by step through early warning 
indicators, includes case studies, gives instructions 
for forming an early warning network, and provides 
methods for ﬁghting the closing.  
 David Ranney’s 1988 article “Manufacturing Job 
Loss and Early Warning Indicators” reviews the literature 
on plant closings to identify 16 local management 
practices  that can be used as early warning indicators 
by those concerned with industrial retention.   Ranney 
emphasizes the need to understand the broader context 
of the plant and its location, ownership structure, 
and industry in order to make sense of the indicator. 
Rob Mier, Commissioner of the Department of Economic Development, and Mayor Harold Washington at a January 18, 
1985 Economic Development Press Conference.  Photo courtesy of the Harold Washington Archives and Collections, Chicago 
Public Library.
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If one of the early warning indicators regarding 
local management practice is present, particularly in 
combination with conglomerate ownership or a local 
ownership succession problem, then further research 
is advised.  Ranney also provides a list of reasons 
why management would close a plant,  which could 
assist workers in understanding the larger economic 
landscape.  Ranney stresses the importance of accessing 
worker knowledge, as local management practices may 
not be visible otherwise.   
Common Principles
 The core ideas behind early warning were shared 
throughout the country.  In 1985, when Swinney founded 
the Federation of Industrial Retention and Renewal 
(FIRR), Chicago became a base for those involved in 
early warning efforts to meet and communicate ideas 
and strategies.  At its peak, FIRR had 40 member 
organizations. While FIRR’s membership probably 
represented the nucleus of early warning work, 
additional groups around the country used a parallel 
approach.   
 In addition to a national network, there were 
regional groups that met to share information and 
resources.  These included the California Coalition 
against Plant Closures, which drew together groups 
across the West Coast, and regional meetings organized 
by MCLR Research that enjoyed participation 
throughout the Rust Belt.  Organizers described these 
coalitions as presenting crucial opportunities to share 
strategies, stories, and resources.  After attending 
regional and national meetings, leaders would return 
to their base organizations with a renewed sense of 
solidarity.  
 Along with discussing ideas about how and why 
early warning work should be done, many organizations 
across the country shared an intellectual foundation. 
Interviews with organizational leaders, as well as 
the publications of the period, reveal the inﬂuence of 
writings such as Bluestone and Harrison’s insights on 
deindustrialization and Luria and Russell’s 1981 book 
Rational Reindustrialization. 
Effects of Early Warning
 Early warning systems produced both concrete 
and intangible effects.  Lynn Feekin  wrote that early 
warning as implemented in Indiana had concrete success 
in preventing plant closures and saving jobs.  Other 
positive effects included clean-ups of contaminated 
sites, commitments of more training dollars, and 
services for displaced workers, all of which came out 
of the community pressure that early warning created. 
Another immediate effect of early warning was that by 
calling attention to the crisis of plant closings and the 
resulting devastation of communities, early warning 
and the resulting anti-plant-closing campaigns set the 
stage for attempts to pass local and national legislation 
designed to protect workers.  Most prominently, the 
1988 federal “Worker Adjustment Retraining and 
Notiﬁcation” (WARN) law required that any plant 
with 100 or more employees give a 60-day notice of a 
scheduled closing.  
Transformative Effects on Participants
 But other effects, equally important, were less 
tangible. Many organizers involved in early warning 
evaluated their success broadly, not only in terms of 
plants saved.  Early warning had signiﬁcant potential 
for transformative effects on participants.  While early 
warning work did not directly address structural issues, 
it did provide an entry point for workers to begin 
exploring questions of economic justice. 
  Swinney describes the potential of early warning 
work as a process of transforming “civic consciousness.” 
A worker can go through his or her entire career 
and never be asked his or her opinion regarding the 
management of the company.  However, when a worker 
is consulted, be it through the vehicle of early warning 
or not, it can be a powerful experience and conﬁrm that 
his or her knowledge on the topic is essential.    
 Early warning work required training sessions 
and meetings, where workers engaged with each other 
and developed stronger community links.  Through 
interactions with both peers and formal educators, 
workers often developed a richer understanding of how 
the economy worked and why a proﬁtable plant might 
be shut down.  This knowledge could help them to 
channel the anger and despair of job loss.  
 Several groups developed international links and 
solidarity with foreign workers. This was particularly 
important as a method for combatting potential 
xenophobia among U.S. manufacturing workers. 
Ellen Teninty, Director of the Plant Closures Project 
in Oakland, described a regional conference in Los 
Angeles in 1982 that drew diverse groups together:
We rented ourselves a bus, and planned a 
conference—we joined the LA coalition with 
the Bay Area Coalition, and the Northern 
California, the Eureka people, and the 
Modesto-Salinas people.  We all went to Los 
Angeles.  We had a two-day conference.  One 
thing that was really fabulous about it was that 
we all had simultaneous translating headsets.  
That really blew everyone away! …And that 
experience—like a little UN or something! 
…And people were trying to understand the 
economic basis of the crisis.  This was the 
beginning, I mean people were saying, our 
plant was making money, why did it need to 
close?  We don’t understand that… It was 
really the beginning of this whole coalition’s 
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parallel to, or derivative of, the history of early warning 
work, many ﬁgures in what became a campaign for 
increased corporate and government responsibility 
reveal interesting linkages with the early warning 
movement.   
Conclusion
Our conclusions are twofold.  First, while the local 
response to industrial decline was ultimately limited by 
the lack of a cohesive national agenda, such a national 
agenda would not have been a substitute for local action. 
Both the national and local levels were important.   
 Second, regarding the legacy of local institutions 
and policy innovations developed during this time, 
we believe that they remain a powerful resource, and 
one that can be built upon to address contemporary 
challenges.  The local capacity developed in response to 
the manufacturing job loss of the 1980s still exists. 
 The two organizations discussed in the Chicago 
case—CUED and MCLR—are still working to make 
Chicago’s economy stronger and more just.  MCLR has 
further evolved, creating the Chicago Manufacturing 
Renaissance Council, a coalitional organization with 
the mission of strengthening Chicago’s manufacturing 
sector, as well as Austin Polytechnical Academy, a 
public high school in the Austin neighborhood that 
prepares students for four-year colleges and careers in 
high-technology industry and entrepreneurship. 
 Other organizations across the country are working 
from a foundation of local innovation, activism and 
research reminiscent of early warning.  The Steel Valley 
Authority, a regional development authority focused 
on revitalizing the Monongahela Valley, depends on its 
Strategic Early Warning Network (SEWN) as a major 
component of its ongoing ﬁght to save jobs.   The Ohio 
Employee Ownership Center at Kent State University 
(OEOC) provides outreach and technical assistance for 
workers and business owners interested in employee 
ownership, as well as general support for employee-
owned businesses.  The Center on Wisconsin Strategy 
(COWS) is a policy center that focuses on “high-
road” economic development, and it has founded other 
innovative ventures in workforce development, such as 
the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership (WRTP). 
The COWS also co-founded the Apollo Alliance, 
a partnership between labor and environmentalists 
working for clean energy and good jobs across the nation. 
A further example is Good Jobs First, a national policy 
research center that focuses on keeping the development 
practices of government and corporations accountable, 
as well as on “smart growth for working families.”  
 These worker-oriented and coalition-based 
approaches to local economic development represent an 
important piece of the national memory.  As the federal 
government crafts a response to today’s epidemic job 
loss, ideally organizations like the ones listed will have 
education about globalization, and how you 
can’t just think it’s the Japanese, because 
of the US investment that’s there and how 
production is being chopped up and divided 
out, and who gets what, and there’s reasons 
for that, that have to do with controlling 
labor costs. 
By engaging in this type of worker education, early 
warning groups sought to shift the manner in which the 
crisis of deindustrialization was understood, thereby 
dispelling false blame from foreign workers.  
Effects on Local Development Practice
 In Chicago, early warning efforts had a strong 
effect on local economic development policy under 
Mayor Washington’s administration.  As noted 
above, the city’s DED provided support to MCLR 
and CUED in the city’s West Side beginning in 1983; 
but the interactions between organizers, community 
members, labor, and factory owners further energized 
city ofﬁcials on behalf of industrial retention.   One 
of Robert Mier’s ﬁrst actions as DED Commissioner 
was a lawsuit designed to support the effort to save the 
Playskool facility.  The campaign to save Playskool 
had originated in the West Side Jobs Network’s early 
warning work.  Parallel efforts included the creation of 
task forces aimed at retaining jobs and ﬁrms in printing, 
apparel, and steel; and the successful campaign led by 
community activist Donna Ducharme to create planned 
manufacturing districts protecting small manufacturers 
from development pressures in prime real estate.  Mier 
(and others) cited the Playskool campaign—and the 
Chicago early warning network—as the key to the city’s 
efforts on other fronts to support its manufacturing jobs 
base (1993).   
 In addition to encouraging an ofﬁcial city response, 
early warning work led many organizations and 
individuals to become involved in developing standards 
for local economic development practices, in particular 
the use of public money.  For example, Feekin described 
the Calumet Project’s evolution toward advocacy for 
worker-friendly economic development policies as a 
realization that behind much of the early warning work
…was the fact that a lot of companies were 
using public dollars and were threatening 
either closure or moving—and they would 
get the public dollars and it wasn’t just a rip-
off where they were exploiting the workers 
and the community but now (in addition) the 
public dollars were being used and stolen.  
So we tried to think how we could get a 
handle on it.    
While the objectives and outcomes were not always 
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an important role to play in the recovery.  Their worker-
centered approach can help keep government spending 
and corporate actions accountable, and may lead to a 
more participatory economic recovery process and more 
equitable outcome.  
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